Constitutional Law - Minors\u27 Right of Privacy versus Parental Right of Control - Access to  Contraceptives Absent Parental Concent - T                H                v. Jones by Smith, Damian C.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1976 | Issue 1 Article 7
3-1-1976
Constitutional Law - Minors' Right of Privacy
versus Parental Right of Control - Access to
Contraceptives Absent Parental Concent - T H v.
Jones
Damian C. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Damian C. Smith, Constitutional Law - Minors' Right of Privacy versus Parental Right of Control - Access to Contraceptives Absent Parental
Concent - T H v. Jones, 1976 BYU L. Rev. 296 (1976).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1976/iss1/7
Constitutional Law-MINORS' RIGHT OF PRIVACY VERSUS PAREN- 
TAL RIGHT OF CONTROLACCESS TO CONTRACEPTIVES AB ENT PAR- 
ENTAL CONSENT-T - H - u. Jones, Civil No. C 74-276 (D. 
Utah, July 23, 1975). 
Utah administered federal aid programs for family planning 
services through the Utah Planned Parenthood Association 
(UPPA). Pursuant to state regulations, UPPA was permitted to 
administer contraceptive services and supplies to a minor only 
with the permission of a parent or guardian.' The minor plaintiff, 
who remains unnamed, applied to UPPA for contraceptives. Al- 
though her family qualified under federal aid  program^,^ the 
plaintiff was denied assistance when she refused to obtain paren- 
tal permission. She therefore sought a declaratory order that the 
state regulations violated her right of access to contraceptives 
under federal statutes3 and her right of privacy under the Four- 
teenth Amendment. A three-judge federal court held that the 
state regulations imposing parental consent requirements were 
1. DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, TATE OF UTAH DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, UPDATED 
DIRECT SERVICES MANUAL MATERIAL, DIRECT SERVICE SECTION V, FPC 120-FPC 201 (Form 
B-75-24-S, 1975) states in pertinent part: 
Federal regulations authorize 90% federal matching under Medicaid for 
offering, arranging, and furnishing directly, or on a contract basis, family plan- 
ning services for eligible persons who desire such services. In conformance with 
State Law, services to minors may be provided only with written consent of 
parents using the appropriate form. 
2. The programs are Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medi- 
caid, which are subsidized by federal funds and regulated by the Social Security Act of 
1935, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. $ 5  601-44, 1396 (1970). For pertinent 
provisions of the AFDC and Medicaid programs see note 3 infra. 
3. The provision for families under the program is set out in 42 U.S.C. $ 602(a)(15) 
(1970), which states in pertinent part that state plans must: 
[Plrovide (A) for the development of a program, for each appropriate relative 
and dependent child receiving aid under the plan . . . for preventing or reducing 
the incidence of births out of wedlock and otherwise strengthening family life, 
and for implementing such program by assuring that in all appropriate cases 
(including minors who can be considered to be sexually active) family planning 
services are offered to them and are provided promptly . . . to all individuals 
voluntarily requesting such services. 
The Medicaid provisions require participating states to provide "medical assistance" 
to all eligible individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(8) (1970). "Medical assistance" is defined 
in 42 U.S.C. $ 1396d(a) (1970): 
The term "medical assistance" means payment of part or all of the costs of the 
following care and services . . . . 
. . . .  
(4)(C) family planning services and supplies . . . to individuals of childbearing 
age (including minors who can be considered to be sexually active) who are 
eligible under the State plan and who desire such services and supplies; . . . 
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void because (1) under the supremacy clause they conflicted with 
federal regulations that impose no such requirement, and (2) 
minors have, under the constitutional right of privacy, a right of 
access to contraceptives that cannot be abridged by a parental 
consent requirement. 
A. Contraceptives and the  Right of R i v a c y  
The United States Supreme Court first decided whether a 
state could prohibit contraceptive use by married persons in 
Griswold v. C o n n e ~ t i c u t . ~  There, the executive and medical direc- 
tors of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut were fined 
for violating state statutes making it a crime both to use and to 
assist another in the use of  contraceptive^.^ The Court held that 
4. 381 US. 479 (1965). The Court twice faced but did not decide the constitutionality 
of the Connecticut statute before Griswold. In Tileston v. Ullman, 318 US .  44 (1943), the 
Court found that the appellant, doctor for the potential users of the contraceptives, lacked 
standing. Later, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 US.  497 (1961), the Court found the case nonjusti- 
ciable because the appellants were suing to prevent the enforcement of the statute without 
violating it and therefore failed to bring the case within the "case or controversy" require- 
ment of the Constitution. 
Griswold was the first Supreme Court case to extend the right of privacy beyond 
unreasonable searches and seizures to personal activities. Roe v. Wade, 410 US.  113 
(1973) and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 US.  179 (1973), extended the right of 
privacy beyond the use of contraceptives to a woman's decision to have an abortion. 
Although the right of privacy has not been explicitly held to cover other activities, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that this "guarantee of personal privacy" extends only to 
"personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.' " Roe v. Wade, 410 US.  113, 152, citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US.  319, 325 
(1937). The Court mentions several activities that would qualify under the standard: 
marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 US.  1,12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535,541-42 (1942); child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U S .  
510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US.  390, 399 (1923). 
Some members of the Court have concluded that other activities may not be suffi- 
ciently "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" to be granted pri- 
vacy protection. Justice Harlan, the first justice to recognize the marital privacy right, 
explicitly excluded homosexuality, fornication, adultery, and incest from protection by 
the right of privacy, "however privately practiced." Poe v. Ullman, 367 US.  497, 552-53 
(1961) (dissenting opinion). Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold and joined by Chief 
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, quoted Justice Harlan's language and likewise ex- 
cluded "sexual promiscuity or misconduct" from protection. 381 US .  479, 498-99 (1965) 
(concurring opinion). Their position was undercut somewhat by Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 (1972). Though Eisenstadt was decided technically on equal protection grounds, 
note 10 and accompanying text infra, the case did inferentially grant some protection to 
extramarital sexual activities by striking down prohibitions on an unmarried person's 
right to use contraceptives. 
5. The Connecticut statute was a fairly unusual one, proscribing use rather than 
regulating distribution and sale. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-32 (1958) (repealed 1969); 
381 US.  a t  485. 
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the prohibition of use was an unconstitutional abridgment of the 
right of "privacy surrounding the marriage relationship" emanat- 
ing from the "penumbras" of "specific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights."' Despite the sweeping rationale of the case, the holding 
was narrow: as to married persons, there can be no wholesale 
prohibition against use. The Court expressly stated that it struck 
down only laws prohibiting the "use of contraceptives rather than 
[laws] regulating their manufacture and sale . . . ."' Thus, it 
appears that a state may restrict access to contraceptives through 
laws validly designed to regulate their sale. 
The right recognized in Griswold was extended to unmarried 
persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird.8 When he exhibited contraceptive 
articles and distributed a package of vaginal foam to a young 
adult unmarried woman, a college lecturer was convicted under 
a Massachusetts law that prohibited any unauthorized persons 
from distributing or selling contraceptive devices and that further 
restricted distribution by authorized dispensers to married per- 
s o n ~ . ~  The Court struck down the statute because, "by providing 
dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are 
similarly situated, [the provisions of the statute] violate the 
Equal Protection Clause."l0 While inferentially granting unmar- 
ried persons the right to use contraceptives, the Court again did 
not grant an unqualified right to obtain them, since it refused to 
say whether laws regulating distribution of contraceptives either 
to married or unmarried persons were permissible.ll Concurring 
and dissenting opinions both expressed the view that a state 
could restrict the distribution of contraceptives for precautionary 
health measures.12 
In another case involving the same statute, Poe u. Ullman, Justice Harlan, dissenting 
in the dismissal, stated: 
[C]onclusive in my view, is the utter novelty of this enactment. Although the 
Federal Government and many states have at one time or other had on their 
books statutes forbidding or regulating the distribution of contraceptives, none, 
so far as I can find, has made the use of contraceptives a crime. 
367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (emphasis in original). 
6. 381 U.S. at 484-86. 
7. Id. a t  485 (emphasis by the Court). 
8. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
9. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, 66 21, 21A (1970). 
10. 405 U.S. at 454-55. 
11. Id. a t  453-54. 
12. Id. a t  460, 465 (White, J., concurring; Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice White 
differentiated between sections 21 and 21A of the Massachusetts General Laws (1970) 
(21A excepts from prosecution registered physicians and pharmacists who dispense the 
same materials to married persons) and found no problem with Massachusetts' "legiti- 
CASE NOTES 
The leading abortion case, Roe v. Wade,I3 may provide the 
logical nexus permitting extension of the right of privacy protec- 
tions to the area of contraceptive access.14 In Roe, the state was 
required to show a compelling interest for regulating a pregnant 
woman's procurement of an abortion.15 Since i t  would arguably 
mate interest in preventing the distribution of articles designed to prevent conception 
which may have undesirable, if not dangerous, physical consequences." Id. a t  463, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 753, 247 N.E.2d 574, 578 (1969). The petitioner 
in this case had merely distributed harmless contraceptive foam. Justice White further 
stated: 
Had Baird distributed a supply of the so-called "pill," I would sustain his 
conviction under this statute. Requiring a prescription to obtain potentially 
dangerous contraceptive material may place a substantial burden upon the right 
recognized in Griswold, but that burden is justified by a strong state interest 
and does not, as did the  statute a t  issue in Griswold, sweep unnecessarily 
broadly or seek "to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive 
impact upon" a protected relationship. 
Id. a t  463 (footnotes omitted). Chief Justice Burger likewise stated: 
The choice of means of birth control, although a highly personal matter, is also 
a health matter in a very real sense, and I see nothing arbitrary in a requirement 
of medical supervision. 
Id. a t  470. 
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); accord, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
14. Roe granted a broad-based privacy right. As contrasted with Griswold, which a t  
least tied the right to "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, Roe rested its decision on the 
privacy right alone. 410 U S .  a t  152-54. For a discussion of Roe's impact on the privacy 
doctrine see The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 55, 82-83 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court, 1972 Term]. 
Roe has provoked the outcry among many scholars that that decision (along with 
Griswold) represents a return to the discredited doctrine of "substantive due process" 
embodied in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and subsequently discarded by the 
Supreme Court beginning with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) and 
culminating in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
For criticisms of the decision see, e.g., Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 174-77 (arguing that, as in Lochner, the Court will have to "examine the 
legislative policies and pass on the wisdom of these policies in the very process of deciding 
whether a particular state interest is 'compelling' "); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A 
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (arguing that Roe is of the Lochner 
tradition, but even less defensible); Note, The Abortion Cases: A Return to Lochner, or a 
New Substantive Due Process?, 37 ALB. L. REV. 776 (1973). 
For defenses see, e.g., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 703 (1975) (arguing that the Supreme Court is not limited to  interpretation only of 
the written text of the Constitution, but may also enforce "principles of liberty and justice 
when the normative content of those principles" is not within the Constitution); Heymann 
& Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 BOST. UNIV. L. REV. 
765 (1973) (defending both the decision and its approach); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 
1973 Term-Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973) (granting that Roe is a return to substantive due process but 
defending its approach as allocating the role of choice to the individual). 
15. 410 U.S. a t  162-64. The Court noted that "a state may properly assert interests 
in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential 
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be inconsistent to grant right of privacy protection to a woman's 
decision to terminate a pregnancy while a t  the same time allow- 
ing the state to control her decision whether or not to become 
pregnant, the state may yet be required to show a compelling 
state interest in its regulation of access to contraceptives.16 
Should this reading of Roe be adopted, however, it appears that 
it would not ultimately resolve the issues raised by the instant 
case. First, neither Griswold, Eisenstadt, nor Roe deals with the 
extent of a state's power over minors.'' Second, even assuming 
that a compelling state interest test were applied to regulation of 
minors' access to contraceptives, that test may be easier to satisfy 
in the regulation of a minor's-as opposed to  an adult's- 
activities.18 
B. Parental Rights 
Historically, parents' rights to raise and train their children 
have been granted a status approaching, if not achieving, funda- 
mentality. Consequently, the Supreme Court has carefully scruti- 
nized state efforts to curtail parental rights. In Prince u. 
Massachu~et ts ,~~ the Court articulated the deference due parental 
rights in these terms: 
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can nei- 
ther supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that these 
decisions have respected the private realm of family life which 
the state cannot enter.20 
life" in the second and third trimesters of pregnancy. Id. a t  154. As to the third trimester, 
the Court gave the state expansive powers: "If the state is interested in protecting fetal 
life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when 
it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. a t  163-64. 
16. This view is urged by Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights 
of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1006-07 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Privacy Rights of Minors], and suggested by The Supreme Court, 
1972 Term, supra note 14, a t  82-83 and Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for 
Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 670, 706 n.221 (1973). 
17. The Court in Roe reserved the issue as to minors. 410 U.S. at 165 n.67. For a 
discussion on the applicability of privacy rights to minors in an abortion context see Note, 
Privacy Rights of Minors, supra note 16, a t  1006-11; Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion 
and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L. REV. 305 (1974). 
18. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Oregon, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), note 42 infra, Ginsberg v. New 
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), text accompanying notes 59-64, 79-85 infra. 
19. 321 US. 158 (1944). 
20. Id. a t  166 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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Although the state's interest prevailed in P r in~e ,~ '  the courts 
have required other state interests, such as compulsory educa- 
tion, to yield to parental rights. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,22 
the Court struck down an Oregon law that attached criminal 
sanctions to parental refusal to send normal children between the 
ages of 8 and 16 to public schools. The law was held to be an 
unreasonable interference "with the liberty of parents and guard- 
ians to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
their control. "23 
In a more contemporary context, Wisconsin v. YoderU reaf- 
firmed the fundamentality of parental rights. Although techni- 
cally decided on free exercise of religion grounds,25 Yoder sus- 
tained the rights of Amish parents to withhold their children from 
21. The Court disallowed the Jehovah's Witness parents from having their children 
sell religious magazines on the street as against the state's legitimate interest in prohibit- 
ing child labor. Id. a t  168-70. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), text 
accompanying notes 24-27 infra. 
For purposes of this discussion, the language of Prince is more important than the 
holding, because the holding does not directly apply. Prince involved two important 
rights-the state interest in regulating child labor and the parents' right to direct the 
child-which were balanced against each other. But in the instant case both state and 
parental rights are allied against a minor's right to privacy. Prince does illustrate, how- 
ever, the deference due parental rights even when balanced against a legitimate state 
interest. 
Also, while Prince allowed the state to encroach upon parents' rights for the child's 
protection, it cannot be read as an expansion of minors' rights. Since the "power of the 
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of authority over adults," 
the state was allowed to curtail the minor's claim of free exercise of religion for what the 
state deemed to be the minor's own protection. 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). 
22. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In addition, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), 
which, despite a conflict with state law, upheld a teacher's right to instruct a child in a 
foreign language. The Pierce and Meyer decisions have since been cited in support of 
parental rights and marital privacy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,213,232-33 (1972) (citing both cases for parental author- 
ity in child rearing and education); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) 
(parental authority in a marital privacy case). 
The Meyer Court noted that although "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment 
had not been given precise definition, certain freedoms included therein were capable of 
precise statement: 
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but 
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to many, establish a home and 
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own consci- 
ence, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at  common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 
262 U.S. a t  399 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
23. 268 U.S. a t  534-35. 
24. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
25. Id. a t  213-15. See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Educa- 
tion, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213 (1973). 
302 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
school beyond the eighth grade. The Court declared that the par- 
ents' duty to prepare the child for "additional obligations" in- 
cludes "the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and 
elements of good citizenship. "26 In this context, the Court viewed 
the Pierce case "as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the 
religious upbringing of their ~hildren."~' 
The status of parental rights, of course, determines the con- 
stitutional test applied when those rights are limited and the 
limitation is subsequently challenged. Since fundamental rights 
may be curtailed only by a compelling state interest,28 the ques- 
tion arises whether parental rights are accorded funda'mentality. 
In Stanley v. I l l i n ~ i s , ~ ~  the Court upheld a father's right to his 
illegitimate children, stating that a parent's "private interest" in 
his children must be protected, "absent a powerful countervailing 
interest."30 Other members of the Court would apply a stricter 
test. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe v. Ullman,31 declared that 
"the integrity [of family life] is something so fundamental that 
it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of more 
than one explicitly granted Constitutional right."32 In Griswold, 
Justice Goldberg said that the "rights to marital privacy and to 
marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as 
the fundamental rights specifically ~ r o t e c t e d . " ~ ~  It appears, 
therefore, that a state may curtail parental rights only to further, 
a t  least, a "powerful countervailing interest," if not a compelling 
one. 
C. Minors' Rights and the Question of Capacity 
At common law, minors had very few legal rights apart from 
26. 406 U.S. a t  233. 
27. Id. a t  233-34. 
28. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U S .  113, 154-55 (1973); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 406 (1963). 
29. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
30. Id. a t  651. 
31. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Justice Harlan dissented from the majority's decision to 
dismiss the case on grounds of nonjusticiability. In that extensive dissent, he also took 
the opportunity to expound his views on the right of privacy. As such, his comments 
quoted in the text above do not necessarily constitute a minority view on the right of 
privacy issue. In fact, right of privacy protection was finally granted against the same 
Connecticut statute in Griswold u. Connecticut, decided 4 years later. Justice Harlan, 
concurring in Griswold, reaffirmed his stance taken in Poe v. Ullman. 
32. Id. a t  551-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting), cited in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U S .  479, 495 (concurring opinion). 
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their families.34 The underlying, if not explicit, justification for 
denying children the legal ability to act on their own was-and 
continues to be-the need to protect them from their own inca- 
pa~i ty .~"  
In the areas of health care36 and  contract^,^' for example, 
there is a presumption of incapacity except for certain narrowly 
applied exceptions. The doctrine of informed consent, long a pre- 
requisite of a physician's right to treat his .patient,38 is an apt 
34. See Katz, Schroeder & Sidman, Emancipating Our Children-Coming of Legal 
Age in America, 7 FAMILY L.Q. 211, 212-14 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Katz]. Children 
were treated more as servants than as individuals with separate rights. See generally 
Kleinfield, The Balance of Power Between Infants, Their Parents and the State, 4 FAMILY 
L.Q. 320 (1970). 
35. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798,803 (W.D.S.C. 1961), wherein 
the court states: 
At common law infants do not possess the power to exercise the same legal 
rights as adults. The disabilities of infants are really privileges, which the law 
gives them, and which they may exercise for their own benefit, the object of the 
law being to secure infants from damaging themselves or their property by their 
own improvident acts or prevent them from being imposed on by others. The 
rights of infants must be protected by the court, while adults must protect their 
own rights. . . . Minority . . . is in itself a recognized badge of incompetency 
of an infant to handle his own affairs. 
Capacity in legal terms is more generally thought to be emotional or judgmental, 
rather than physical, capacity. Physical incapacity is a limit in itself, without the necess- 
ity of legally imposed limits. An adult paraplegic, or one afflicted with a physically 
debilitating disease such as multiple sclerosis, is not precluded from acting as any other 
mentally normal adult, and may, in some circumstances, be granted license to participate 
in activities with physical counterparts, such as driving. On the other hand, a 13-year- 
old child may be physically able to drive a car yet is denied a license because of his 
presumed judgmental incapacity. 
The emotional maturity factor involves more than the simple power of cognition. This 
cognitive power is basically established by age 16. See Elkin, Egocentrism in Adolescence, 
38 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1025, 1032 (1967). But judgmental skill and emotional maturity 
necessary to sort out complex moral variables are largely functions of age and experience. 
See A. KAY, MORAL DEVELOPMENT 179-83 (1968). 
36. See RESTATEMENT OF ORTS $ 892, comment e (1939). See generally Stem, Medical 
Treatment and the Teenager: The Need for Parental Consent, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1 , 4  
(1973); Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
115 (1973); Privacy Rights of Minors, supra note 16, a t  1001-05; Note, Minors and Contra- 
ceptives: The Physician's Right to Assist Unmarried Minors in California, 23 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1486 (1972). 
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS $ 4  18, 18B (1973); 2 S. WILLISTON, 
CONTRACTS $9 222-48 (3d ed. 1959); cf. UTAH CODE ANN. 15-2-1 to -4 (1953) (specifying age 
of majority and providing for rescission of contracts by minors). 
38. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125,105 N.E. 92 (1914). 
A doctor who performs services upon a patient without his informed consent has techni- 
cally committed a battery. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941). But 
see Pilpel, Minor's Right to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L. REV. 462, 466 (1972), noting that 
while doctors remain fearful of the consequences of treating minors without parental 
consent, no case has been found where liability was imposed on a physician treating a 
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illustration. A minor is presumed incapable of giving informed 
consent unless the circumstances show his e m a n c i ~ a t i o n ~ ~  or his 
status as a "mature minor."40 Both the emancipation and "ma- 
ture minor" exceptions rebut the presumption of incapacity. Vot- 
ing provides a further illustration of the operation of the incapac- 
ity concept. Although i t  constitutes a fundamental constitutional 
right,41 children may properly be denied the right to vote." Re- 
strictions on exercise of certain constitutional rights43 as well as 
on certain other activities such as driving, drinking, and marry- 
ing44 are also premised on the incapacity concept. 
Although in recent years much sentiment has been mar- 
shalled for the extension of children's rights," the cases viewed 
minor over 15 without parental consent. 
39. See, e.g., Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16, 21, 431 P.2d 719, 723 (1967) (married 
18-year-old considered capable of consenting to vasectomy). 
40. See, e.g., Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 
469 P.2d 330 (1970) (17-year-old girl found sufficiently able to understand and compre- 
hend nature and consequences of skin graft, and therefore parental consent unnecessary). 
In addition to the mature minor and emancipated minor exceptions to the informed 
consent doctrine, "emergency" constitutes a third exception to the informed consent rule. 
See, e.g., Wells v. McGehee, 39 So. 2d 196, 202 (La. App. 1949) (doctor released from 
liability for death of child incurred in treatment without the parent's consent because 
immediate action necessary for preservation of health of the child); Luka v. Lowrie, 171 
Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912) (amputation performed without consent on comatose 
patient justified as necessary to save life); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279 
N.Y.S. 575, 577-78 (N.Y .C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1935) (administration of anesthesia 
with minor's but without parent's consent justified under emergency conditions). The 
question of a minor's capacity, however, is generally irrelevant to the emergency excep- 
tion. 
41. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 662, 667, 670 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U S .  533, 
554-55 (1964). 
42. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U S .  112 (1970) (no majority opinion), the Supreme 
Court sustained the law reducing the age a t  which persons may vote in a national election 
from 21 to 18, but allowed states to maintain higher age limits for local elections. 
43. In First Amendment areas, for instance, American courts have allowed differen- 
tial treatment of children and adults: 
The world of children is not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression. 
The factor of immaturity, and perhaps other considerations, impose different 
rules. Without attempting here to formulate the principles relevant to freedom 
of expression for children, it suffices to say that regulations of communication 
addressed to them need not conform to the requirements of the first amendment 
in the same way applicable to adults. 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 n.6 (1968), quoting Emerson, Toward a General 
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 866, 939 (1963). But see Tinker v. Des 
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969), notes 53-58 infra. 
44. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. 8 30-1-2 (1969) (requiring parental consent for minors 
to marry). 
45. See, e.g., Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 343 (1972); 
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as extending children's rights seem not to disturb the basic pre- 
sumption of incapacity. The courts in those cases either pre- 
sumed incapacity or deemed the concept irrelevant to resolution 
of the issues. Children's criminal rights cases provide one exam- 
ple. The landmark decision, In Re G ~ u l t , ~ "  explicitly granted chil- 
dren rights not recognized before, including rights to notice of 
charges, hearing, counsel, confrontation of witnesses, and the 
privilege against self-incrimination."' In the process of granting 
these rights, however, the Court acknowledged the minor's inher- 
ent incapacity. The abysmal lack of due process in Gault's and 
other minors' cases48 convinced the Court that if adults are 
granted certain procedural safeguards, a fortiori children, be- 
cause of limitations due to their age (that is, their in~apacity) ,"~ 
should likewise be protected. Realizing that "admissions and con- 
fessions of juveniles require special caution"50 as to reliability and 
voluntariness, and that "special problems may arise with respect 
to waiver of the privilege [against self-incrimination] by or on 
Forer, Rights of Children: The Legal Vacuum, 55 A.B.A.J. 1152 (1969); Katz, supra note 
34. 
46. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
47. Id. a t  31-57. 
48. The creation of a separate criminal system for children was motivated by a desire 
to rehabilitate the child through nonadversary means rather than through criminal stric- 
tures. At the same time, a notion of longstanding currency that children are entitled "not 
to liberty but to custody," 367 U.S. a t  17, gave a great deal of discretion to juvenile court 
officials and led inevitably to abuses. Justice Fortas stated the problem in Gault: 
[Tlhe highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system 
for juveniles, unknown to  our law in any comparable context. . . . [Tlhe re- 
sults have not been entirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again dem- 
onstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is fre- 
quently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. 
Id. at  17-18. 
In another children's criminal rights case, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 
(1966), the Court stated that "studies and critiques of recent years raise serious questions 
as to whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to 
make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of Constitutional guarantees 
applicable to adults." See generally Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary 
System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 7. 
49. The problems of minors placed in a criminal setting drew this comment from 
Justice Douglas: 
Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy . . . . He cannot be judged by the 
more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and 
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the 
period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. 
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948), quoted in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45-46 
(196q). 
50. 387 U.S. a t  45. 
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behalf of ~hildren,"~' the Court accorded to juveniles the "adult" 
rights listed above.52 
Tinker v. Des Moines School Districta is representative of 
another line of cases, dealing with students in public school sys- 
tems, considered to have expanded children's r ighks4 The Court, 
without mentioning the incapacity concept, upheld the right of 
students to wear armbands in opposition to the Vietnam war as 
an exercise of their First Amendment rights: "Students . . . are 
'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of funda- 
mental rights which the State must respect, just as they them- 
selves must respect their obligations to the State."55 Failure to 
mention the question of capacity in Tinker and other similar 
cases may stem from either of two assumptions. First, minors 
possess the requisite capacity,56 or perhaps more accurately, a 
51. Id. a t  55. 
52. Many commentators have used and abused the language and holdings of chil- 
dren's rights cases such as Gault. Care must be taken, however, to determine what Gault 
did and did not hold. The Court's granting of significant rights and its broad dictum that 
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone," 367 U.S. 
a t  13, must be qualified by the fact that the minor has not been accorded rights explicitly 
granted in the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U S .  528 (1971) 
(trial by jury); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (bail, indictment by grand jury, 
speedy and public trial). 
While the Court in Kent u. United States recognized the possibility of the juvenile's 
being shortchanged in terms of both procedural safeguards and treatment, constitutional 
guarantees were nevertheless withheld: 
[Tlhere may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both 
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous 
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children. 
This concern, however, does not induce us . . . to rule that constitutional 
guarantees which would be applicable to adults charged with the serious offen- 
ses for which Kent was tried must be applied in juvenile proceedings . . . . 
383 U.S. a t  556. This treatment reflects the fact that, notwithstanding Gault, juvenile 
proceedings continue to be civil and not criminal in nature. 
53. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
54. Other key cases involving extension or recognition of children's rights occur in the 
same context. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process rights afforded 
student facing temporary suspension from school); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (equal protection extended to Black children); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (allowing a student to refuse to recite the Pledge of Alle- 
giance). 
55. 393 U.S. a t  511. 
56. See Priuacy Rights of Minors, supra note 16, a t  1009. But see Justice Stewart's 
concurrence in Tinker: 
[I] cannot share the Court's uncritical assumption that, school discipline aside, 
the First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive with those of adults 
. . . .  "[A] State may permissibly determine that, a t  least in some precisely 
delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed 
of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of the First 
Amendment guarantees." 
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child's capacity, though limited, is adequate to the symbolic ex- 
pression of political views. Second, even though the child lacks 
capacity, the unique nature of the child's situation in the public 
school system demands free expression nonetheless. The Su- 
preme Court has indicated its apprehension that students may 
become, through state efforts to mold "the free mind a t  its 
source,"57 "closed circuit recipients of only that which the State 
chooses to communicate. "5s 
Because of the child's presumed incapacity, the state and the 
parent have been placed in commanding positions as protectors 
of children. Ginsberg v. New Y ~ r k , ~ ~  for example, upheld New 
York's right to curtail sales of pornographic literature to persons 
under 17 because of the material's allegedly harmful impact upon 
minors. The state's rationale, that minors' contact with pornogra- 
phy "impair[s] the ethical and moral development of our 
assumed the minor's inability to handle explicit sexual 
material. The Court accepted that assumption and did not re- 
quire "scientifically certain criteria of legi~lat ion,"~~ content that 
if the assumption had not been demonstrated at  least i t  had not 
been disproved.62 Further, unlike cases dealing with the First 
Amendment rights of adults, where only a compelling state inter- 
est may justify abridgment, Gins berg required only that the legis- 
lature's purpose be "not irrati~nal." '~ In deferring to the state, the 
Court "recognized that even where there is an invasion of pro- 
tected freedoms, 'the power of the state to control the conduct of 
children reaches beyond the scope of authority over adults 
. . . .  
7 ,964 
393 U.S. a t  515, quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
57. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
58. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
59. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See also Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 
731-32, 738 (1970) (protection of minors part of policy considerations underlying law 
allowing a householder to prevent objectionable material from being mailed to his home). 
60. Id. at  641. 
61. Id. at  642-43, quoting Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911). 
62. 390 U.S. at  642, citing Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth,  1966 S. 
CT. REV. 7, 75. 
63. Id. at  641. 
64. Id. at  638, quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). This differ- 
ential treatment appears justified by the fact that "[clhildren have a very special place 
in the law which law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily 
lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State's duty 
toward children." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528,536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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The court granted the minor plaintiff the right of access to 
contraceptives on two bases. First, since the Utah regulations 
explicitly required parental consent before minors could procure 
contraceptives from the UPPA, the state engrafted a condition of 
eligibility not required by the governing federal statutes and regu- 
lations. The state regulations, therefore, conflicted with the fed- 
eral scheme and were required to give way under the supremacy 
clause? Second, the condition of parental consent placed an im- 
permissible burden on the minor's constitutional right of pri- 
vacy? The court relied on Roe u. Wade6' to find that the right of 
65. T - H - v. Jones, Civil No. C 74-276 (D. Utah, July 23, 1975), at  10. The 
dissent argued that there was no conflict with federal statutes, placing emphasis on the 
phrases "in all appropriate cases," 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(15) (1970) and "who are eligible 
under the State plan," 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (1970) as showing the extent of the 
discretion given the state plan. Jones, supra, dissent a t  2-3. The dissent also pointed to 
the federal regulations denoting the family, not merely the individual members of the 
family, as having the right to accept or reject such plans, 45 C.F.R. § 220.16(c) (1974). 
Jones, supra, dissent a t  3-4. Finally, the dissent quoted 42 U.S.C. 8 601 (1970), which 
states the objective of the act: 
[T]o help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or 
relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and per- 
sonal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care 
and protection . . . . 
Id. a t  6 (emphasis by the dissent). 
66. Only a handful of cases have yet treated the issue of the minor's right of privacy. 
Only one other case besides the instant case has been found where the court treats the 
issue of the minor's right of access to contraceptives via the right of privacy. Population 
Services Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) was decided approximately 2 
weeks prior to Jones. In Population Services, although not concerned with the parental 
consent requirement, the court granted injunctive relief against a New York law which 
prohibited the sale or distribution of contraceptives to children under 16 by one other than 
a licensed pharmacist and disallowed the advertisement of contraceptive devices. The 
court held that the statute infringed on the right of privacy and enjoined enforcement of 
the provision prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to persons under the age of 16. 
Although Population Services granted the minor the right of access to contraceptives, 
that decision differed from the instant case in several ways. First, unlike Jones, the state 
asserted no interest in enforcing the parental right. Second, the decision referred only to 
non-prescription contraceptive devices, id. at  325, whereas in Jones no such distinction 
was made. Third, despite the holding invalidating the law as "overly restrictive," id. at  
336, the court recognized countervailing state interests, even though not asserted by the 
state: 
The State may well have legitimate interests, not asserted in this action, e.g., 
promoting quality control and sanitary delivery of these products, or protecting 
the health and safety of those citizens who use them, which would be substan- 
tially furthered by other limitations on distribution. 
Id. The court therefore stayed the injunction against enforcement of the law for 120 days, 
to "give the state legislature opportunity to enact narrower provisions, if it chooses to, 
which reflect appropriate constitutional concerns, without depriving the State of all legis- 
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privacy protecting the right to an abortion likewise assured an 
adult the right of access to contraceptives: "If, as Roe teaches, the 
fourteenth amendment protects a woman's right to decide 
whether she will terminate her pregnancy, it must also, we be- 
lieve, protect her right to take measures to guard against preg- 
n a n ~ y . " ~ ~  The Supreme Court's recognition, however, that a 
"state may legitimately curtail the rights of children where it 
protects them from their own incapacity to fend for them- 
selves,"6g necessitated that the requisite capacity be found before 
this same right could be extended to minors. The court found that  
adequate protections already existed to protect minors from their 
own incapacity in the fact that the family aid program provided 
for the presence of trained personnel to advise children in the use 
of birth control devices. Further, in view of the multifaceted prob- 
lems facing an unwed teenage mother, no "developmental differ- 
ences" distinguished minors and adults so as  to render the right 
of access less important to minors. The incapacity concept there- 
fore could not prevent extension to minors of a right of access to 
contraceptives. 
The court did not find the interests advanced by the state 
sufficiently compelling to curtail the minor's right. The state in- 
terest in protecting the minor from the effects of actions inimical 
to the mores of society was deemed inadequate to sustain the 
restrictions embodied in the regulations since those restrictions 
affected only poor families qualifying for federal aid. The state's 
failure to apply the requirements equally to affluent minors un- 
dercut its claim of a compelling interest.'O 
The court, without elaboration, dismissed the state's interest 
in enforcing parental prerogatives. Those prerogatives "are enti- 
lation in this area in the interim while such measures are considered." Id. a t  340-41. In 
Jones, no such countervailing interests are recognized, and the state is given no chance 
to enact narrower provisions which the court would permit. 
The Utah Supreme Court confronted an essentially identical fact situation in Doe v. 
Utah Planned Parenthood Ass'n, 29 Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d 75, stay denied, 413 U.S. 917 
(1973). The Utah Supreme Court rejected the equal protection argument advanced by the 
plaintiff, stating that a denial of contraceptives "to single minor children is not a denial 
of the equal protection of the law, as they are not in the same class with married people." 
Id. a t  359, 510 P.2d at  76. The court did not treat,the privacy issue. 
Several other courts have granted the right to an abortion without parental consent 
to minors. See, e.g., Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1973); Coe v. Gerstein, 
376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 279 (1974); Doe v. Rampton, 
366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975). 
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra. 
68. Jones, supra a t  11. 
69. Id. at  11-12. 
70. See note 95 infra. 
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tled to considerable legal deferenceW7l but nevertheless must, in 
some circumstances, give way to valid state interests. In the same 
manner, "the state's interest in enforcing parental prerogatives 
must yield to the fundamental rights of minors." Consequently, 
"the state may not enforce the choice of parents in conflict with 
a minor's constitutional right of free access to birth control infor- 
mation and devices. "72 
This case note does not analyze the court's treatment and 
resolution of the supremacy clause issue. Rather, it focuses on the 
second rationale for the court's decision: the constitutional right 
of privacy protects a minor's right of access to contraceptives. In 
this context, the case note examines the court's creation of that 
right in light of traditional concepts of capacity. Further, it ana- 
lyzes the intersection of the minor's purported right with parental 
rights of control and state interests in enforcing parental preroga- 
tives. 
This restriction of the scope of the analysis appears justified 
by the fact that the instant case undoubtedly extended constitu- 
tional concepts of privacy while a t  the same time significantly 
undermining traditional concepts of incapacity and parental 
rights. To reach its holding, the court (1) granted to adults an 
unprecedented right of access to contraceptives on the strength 
of Roe v. Wade; ( 2 )  found that minors have the requisite capacity 
to share that right coequally with adults; and (3) secured the 
primacy of the minor's right without seriously balancing it 
against either the parents' right of control or the state's interest 
in enforcing parental control. The first aspect of the court's deci- 
sion-use of Roe v. Wade to grant adults the right of access to 
contraceptives-is not challenged here, although the court 
unquestionably enlarged the individual's right of access.73 The 
71. Id. at  14. 
72. Id. a t  15. 
73. The court admitted this point: 
The Supreme Court has never determined whether the Constitutional right 
of privacy developed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, and succeeding 
cases includes the right to obtain family planning services and materials free 
from unjustified government interference. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
the Court expressly refused to decide whether individuals have a right of access 
to contraceptives. 
Jones, supra at  10. See also notes 4-12 and accompanying text supra. 
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court's use-or arguably, abuse-of principles of incapacity, how- 
ever, merits critical examination. 
A. The Court$ Treatment of Minors' Incapacity 
To assume that Roe can be fairly read to grant to adults a 
right of access to contraceptives does not resolve whether the 
same right must be extended to children. Prior to that determina- 
tion, a court must find, as the majority in the instant case recog- 
nized, the requisite capacity. 
The court's failure to define what it meant by "capacity" 
creates a troublesome ambivalence in the instant case. On the 
one hand, the court's statement that the minor's "incapacity to 
fend for himself' is remedied by the presence of trained personnel 
suggests precisely that the minor does not possess the requisite 
capacity. By relying on the presence of social workers in the fam- 
ily assistance program to rebut the incapacity argument raised by 
the state, the court in effect recognized that children are incapa- 
ble of making the contraception decision without adult guidance. 
In other words, rather than establishing capacity, and hence a 
basis for the extension of a right of access, the court concedes, 
perhaps unwittingly, the absence of that  requisite capacity. 
There appears, therefore, under this aspect of the court's own 
approach, no valid reason for disregarding the limitations that 
the incapacity concept has traditionally imposed on minors' 
rights. 
On the other hand, the second argument raised by the court 
to resolve the incapacity issue-that "no developmental differ- 
ences" distinguish minors from adults-confuses capacity with 
need. This approach assumes that reproductive ability coincides 
with the judgmental maturity necessary to sustain a right of ac- 
cess to contraceptives. Although this approach presents a simple 
administrative solution,74 it is doubtful whether the approach's 
underlying assumption can withstand challenge. The fact that a 
9-year-old may be physically capable of operating an automobile 
does not in itself justify granting him a license, absent some 
analysis of his judgmental powers. It is likewise erroneous to as- 
sume that physical capacity to reproduce necessarily brings the 
74. This is the solution to the age requirement used by State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 
901, 911, 530 P.2d 260, 267 (1975), in which the Washington Supreme Court upheld an 
unmarried minor's right to obtain an abortion without parental consent. In considering 
the age of consent, the court stated: "The age of fertility provides a practical minimum 
age requirement for consent to abortion, reducing the need for a legal one." Id. 
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emotional maturity necessary for wise resolution of the contra- 
ception decision .75 In any event, broad factual determinations 
concerning the capacity of minors as a class is arguably best left 
to the legislature, with its superior ability to resolve such ques- 
tions of fact. Little justification appears for the court's substitu- 
tion in the present case of its own judgment on this broad ques- 
tion of fact for that of the legislature."This is especially true in 
light of the ipse dixit fashion in which the court asserted its 
factual conclusion. 
B. Alternative Standards of Judicial Scrutiny 
If minors lack sufficient capacity to exercise properly the 
right of access to contraceptives absent adult guidance, the 
court's recognition of such a right as fundamental appears erro- 
neous. That recognition places the court in the tenuous position 
of asserting that a significant class is possessed of a fundamental 
right it is ill-equipped to handle. Further, since the curtailment 
of a fundamental right triggers application of a strict or compel- 
ling state interest standard of judicial scrutiny,77 the court's use 
of that rigorous standard in the present case is necessarily unwar- 
ranted. 
75. Whether a minor is physically capable of sexual reproduction or not in other 
contexts appears to be wholly irrelevant if emotional maturity is not found. See, e.g., 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), where a minor was denied the privilege to 
purchase pornography because of its allegedly harmful impact on him. A minor is not 
permitted to enter certain movies for the same reason. See, e.g., Note, "For Adults Only ": 
The Constitutionality of Governmental Film Censorship by Age Classification, 69 YALE 
L.J. 141 (1959). 
76. The decision involves exceedingly complex social problems which the court is 
simply ill-equipped to assess and determine. Such questions deserve thorough empirical 
studies and evaluations which the legislature is best equipped to make. See note 78 infra. 
Assumptions need to be tested. One implicit assumption which the court indulges in 
is that free access to contraceptives will effect a significant curtailment of illegitimacies. 
Factors which would tend to undermine that assumption are the sporadic and unplanned 
nature of teenage sexual activity, ignorance of birth control methods, inadequate motiva- 
tion to use the available devices (see, e.g., STATE OF UTAH DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 1970 
ANNUAL REPORT OF UTAH VITAL STATISTICS 30 (1973) (indicating that even adult women in 
Utah bearing illegitimate children could have avoided pregnancy by availing themselves 
of the contraceptive services offered)), failure of the devices through improper application 
or continuation, and increases in sexual activity. See Westoff, Coital Frequency and 
Contraceptives, 6 FAMILY PUNNING PERSPECTIVES 136,141 (1974) (documenting an increase 
in intercourse among married people using contraceptives of approximately 14 percent in 
corrected figures). 
On the other hand, certain costs to society need to be evaluated, such as the possible 
effects of free access to contraceptives on promiscuity among minors, venereal disease, and 
family solidarity. Such problems do not lend themselves to fascile determination. The 
legislature could well determine that the social costs far outweigh the possible benefits. 
77. See note 28 supra. 
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Rather than apply the rigorous and interventionist compel- 
ling state interest standard,7R strong arguments appear that the 
court should have applied a Ginsberg-type rational basis test. 
Ginsberg v. New Y ~ r k ~ ~  allows a state to protect its children from 
their own incapacity, even though state-imposed limitations may 
infringe on what otherwise are "protected areas" of minors' 
rights? The Court stated that the "well-being of children is of 
78. Upon a court's decision that an interest may be abridged only by a "compelling 
state interest," the court has essentially determined that the particular interest must 
prevail. One commentator has noted that the standard imposes such a severe burden of 
justification on the state as to be a "statement of a conclusion rather than a measure of 
constitutionality. The issue in those cases is resolved in the determination whether a 
fundamental interest is adversely affected." Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory 
Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213, 232 
(1973). See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 
(1969). Chief Justice Burger similarly noted: 
Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the "compelling state 
interest" standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law 
has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever 
will, for it demands nothing less than perfection. 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (dissenting opinion). 
The imposition of a compelling interest standard in the instant case substituted the 
court's judgment for that of the legislature. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, long adverse to an 
interventionist stand by the courts, would repose that responsibility with the legislature 
when competing interests are involved: 
How are competing interests to be assessed? Since they are not subject to 
quantitative ascertainment, the issue necessarily resolves itself into asking, who 
is to make the adjustments? . . . Full responsibility for the choice cannot be 
given to the courts. Courts are not representative bodies. . . . Their judgment 
is best informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits. Their 
essential quality is detachment, founded on independence. History teaches us 
that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become em- 
broiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing 
between competing political, economic and social pressures. 
Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in the 
situation before us of necessity belongs to the Congress. . . . We are to set aside 
the judgments of those whose duty it is to legislate only if there is no reasonable 
basis for it. 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (concurring opinion). 
79. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
80. See notes 59-64 and accompanying text supra. It is clear in the present context 
that a state may protect its youth from what it deems morally undesirable elements. In 
Miller u. California, the Court "recognized that  the States have a legitimate interest in 
prohibiting dissemination of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries 
with it a significant danger . . . of exposure to juveniles." 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973). 
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961), argued that a 
state does have an interest in the moral welfare of its citizenry: 
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may 
be used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and 
brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual 
practices which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to 
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course a subject within the State's power to reg~late,"~' and "two 
interests justify the limitations" on minor's activities. First, 
"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that 
the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct 
the rearing of their children is basic to the structure of our so- 
ciety." Thus, the "legislature could properly conclude that par- 
ents and others . . . who have this primary responsibility for 
children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed 
to aid discharge of that re~ponsibility."~~ Second, the "State also 
has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth."s3 The 
Court stated that, in view of these interests, to exclude the mate- 
rial required only "that we be able to say it was not irrational for 
the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by 
the statute is harmful to minors."s4 Further, in the application of 
this "not irrational" standard, the state's position was not hind- 
ered by lack of proof of the assumptions underlying the state- 
imposed restrictions since the Court would not demand "scientif- 
ically certain criteria of legi~lation."~~ 
The instant case involves interests and rights similar, if not 
identical, to those considered in Ginsberg: a state interest in the 
well-being of its youth and in parents' rights to direct the up- 
bringing of their children poised against the minor's assertedly 
unqualified right to engage in certain ac t iv i t i e~ .~~ Both cases in- 
- -  - - - -- -- - 
lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our 
social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that 
basis. 
81. 390 U S .  a t  639. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. a t  640. 
84. Id. at  641. 
85. Id. at  643. 
86. Of course, parental rights and minors' best interests ideally will coincide. Yet 
even if those interests are not in every instance served by parental choices, the child 
ultimately shares an interest in preserving parental rights, as enforced by the state in the 
instant case. One commentator has observed: 
[Parental] interests are entitled to "specia1,safeguards" and may be so en- 
twined in "[tlhe entire fabric of the Constitution" as to warrant ninth amend- 
ment protection. The parent even has a right to be wrong concerning the child's 
best interests. As a constituent of the family, the child shares an interest in 
preservation of that right, even if the parent is sometimes mistaken about opti- 
mal choices. Indeed, the explanation for the parental right is largely the inti- 
macy of the family unit and the beneficial effects of the family on the child's 
development. 
Soifer, Parental Autonomy, Family Rights and the  Illegitimate: A Constitutional 
Commentary, 7 CONN.  L. REV. 1, 45 (1974) (emphasis added), quoting United States v. 
Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1965) 
(Goldberg, J. concurring). 
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volve incursions on "protected areas" of minors' rights for what 
the state deems to be the best interests of the child. Also, both 
cases involve state-created restrictions designed to aid parents in 
the discharge of their responsibility to insure the well-being of 
their children. Given this  significant correlation between 
Ginsberg and the present case, therefore, the standard of judicial 
scrutiny articulated in the former appears wholly appropriate for 
application in the latter. If the Ginsberg test were applied, Utah's 
parental consent requirement would almost certainly be sus- 
tained. The reasoning underlying that requirement-that paren- 
tal guidance in the contraception decision is necessary to both the 
moral development of minors and protection of their health-87 is 
clearly not irrational. Even if the state's reasoning admits of no 
87. The state may have felt, in view of an appraisal of its citizenry, that parental 
guidance and control of children's use of contraceptives would assure greater protection 
and more personal supervision of contraceptive use. It is undeniable that the use of 
contraceptives presents a growing health problem. One study based on California data 
estimates that there are a t  least 3,000 deaths of young women per year and 30,000 serious 
non-fatal illnesses from the use of oral contraceptives. H. WILLIAMS, THE PILL IN NEW 
PERSPECTIVE 16, 131-38 (1969). Some researchers have presented evidence that the death 
rate from contraceptives is as high as from induced hospital abortions. B. SARVIS & H. 
RODMAN, THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 150 (1973). The birth control pill increases the risk 
of thromboembolic disorders by nine times, according to one research team. Vessey & Doll, 
Investigation o f  Relation between Use of  Oral Contraceptives and Thromboembolic 
Disease, BRITISH MEDICAL J . ,  April 27, 1968, a t  199, 205. The official FDA study on oral 
contraceptives lists the risk of complication from blood-clotting disorders as six times 
greater among users than among nonusers. In addition, anyone with liver problems, breast 
cancer, kidney disease, high blood pressure, diabetes, epilepsy, asthma, fibroids of the 
uterus, migraine headaches or mental depressions are advised against the use of the pill 
without expert medical supervision. For a detailed report on the effects of contraceptive 
use see FDA, REPORT ON ORAL CONTRACEFTIVES BY THE ADVISORY COMM. ON OBSTETRICS AND 
GYNECOLOGY (1966). Other studies indicate correlations with gall bladder and gallstone 
problems at  double the rate of nonusers. See Connell, The Pill Revisited, 7 FAMILY PLAN- 
NING PERSPECTIVES 62, 64-65 (1975) (also documenting the increased incidence of cardiac 
and multiple congenital abnormalities of the VACTRL type (vertebral, anal, cardiac, 
tracheoesophageal, renal and limb defects)). In addition, see Hormones Linked to Birth 
Defects, 106 SCI. NEWS, Oct. 26, 1974, a t  261-62. See generally Note, Liability of Birth 
Control Manufacturers, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1526 (1972). 
The risks associated with other forms of contraceptives, e.g., the intra-uterine device 
(IUD), are likewise not immune from controversy. See Drug Firm and FDA Suspend IUD 
Sales, 106 SCI. NEWS, July 13, 1974, a t  22 (result of fatalities from device known as Dalkon 
Shield). Although the risk is slight in relation to the magnitude of use, the parents' 
interests may well be represented by one commentator's statement relating especially to 
birth control pills: 
After all, we are dealing with only a few deaths per hundred thousand users, 
which does not sound like very much until your wife, lover, or daughter is the 
one who dies from it, or until you take into account that many millions are now 
swallowing it regularly and that the number of fatalities continues to rise. 
A. ETZIONI, THE GENETIC FIX 168 (1973). 
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categorical proof, under Ginsberg the lack of empirical certainty 
provides no grounds for invalidation of the  regulation^.^^ 
C. Parental Rights and State Interests 
The most significant flaw in this decision arises from the 
court's failure fully to recognize and vindicate both parental 
rights of control and the state's interest in insuring the exercise 
of those rights. Essentially, the court failed adequately to balance 
parental rights and the state's concomitant interest against the 
minor's newly recognized right of access to c o n t r a c e p t i ~ e s . ~ ~  
Rather than engaging in a careful balancing process, the court 
relied upon cases and statutes that demonstrate instances of state 
encroachment on parental rights.'O These authorities, however, 
are of doubtful applicability to the issues of the present case. 
The court's authorities demonstrate that, in some contexts, 
the state's interest in protecting minors outweighs parental 
rights; in each context, a valid state interest prevails against the 
parent. That result, however, does little or nothing to establish 
that, when a conflict exists between parents' and minors' rights, 
the latter must necessarily prevail. At most, the authorities cited 
by the court demonstrate the fact that parental rights are not 
absolute-leading only to the conclusion that the rights of par- 
ents must be carefully balanced one against the rights of children 
when those rights unavoidably conflict. The fact that parental 
rights are not unlimited does not, as the court appears to assume, 
dictate the conclusion that the rights of children must prevail. 
If the state and parental interests identified in the present 
case were carefully balanced against a minor's right of access to 
contraceptives, the former would almost certainly prevail. Al- 
though the right of privacy, the basis of the minor's claim, has 
been accorded fundamental status, that fundamentality becomes 
attenuated in areas where the application of the right itself is 
88. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra. See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. 
Slaton, 413 U S .  49, 52 (1973), wherein the Court states: 
The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about 
what is good for the people, including imponderable aesthetic assumptions, is 
not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional. 
89. Before such a balancing test could occur, that right of access to contraceptives 
would have to be recognized and extended to the minor, as was done in this case. 
90. The court gives as examples of situations where "valid state interests" have 
encroached upon parental rights: enforcement of compulsory education, regulating child 
labor, preventing parental neglect, and providing for the general health. Jones, supra at 
14. 
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tenuous. Such an application arguably occurred in the instant 
case. The court, without precedent, created in adults a right of 
access to  contraceptive^,^' then again without precedent and 
seemingly in disregard of well-established concepts of capacity 
extended that right to minors.g2 On the other hand, parental 
rights have consistently been accorded fundamental status.93 Fur- 
ther, the state's Department of Social Services necessarily con- 
fronted the conflict between parental rights of control and the 
interests of minors in unimpeded access to contraceptives when 
it promulgated the regulations challenged in the instant case. It 
opted for the former and included the parental consent require- 
ment in the regulatory scheme. That decision, given the expertise 
of the Department in the area, merits some, and perhaps substan- 
tial, deference. 
Also, it appears that the court's failure to balance the com- 
peting interests involved must give rise to undesirable conse- 
quences. First, if the minor's asserted right of access to contracep- 
tives can prevail over parental rights of control, a court will be 
compelled, in order to avoid an untenable inconsistency, to sus- 
tain that right in the event a state-employed social worker, whose 
judgment has been substituted for that of the parent, determines 
that a child in a particular case should not receive contraceptives. 
Thus, the state will be deprived of the opportunity to operate one 
of its programs in a manner that, in its judgment, best insures 
the well-being of program beneficiaries. Second, in apparent fear 
that some parents, contrary to the seeming best interests of the 
child, may unreasonably withhold consent from their children to 
obtain contraceptives, the court wholly abrogated all parents' 
rights of binding control in their child's contraception decision. 
Such an abrogation seems no more justified than removing cus- 
tody of children from all parents because of the possibility that 
some parents may abuse or neglect their children.94 A better solu- 
91. See note 73 supra. 
92. Although there is some lower court precedent wherein the minor's right of privacy 
has been recognized, see note 66 supra, the Supreme Court has never recognized a right 
of privacy in minors. See Note, Privacy Rights of Minors, supra note 16, at 1009; Note, 
The Minor's Right to an Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 V A .  L. 
REV. 305, 316-17 (1974). 
93. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra. 
94. Even in the cases where custody of the child is taken from neglectful or abusive 
parents, there is continuing debate whether the child is better off under poor parents or 
traditionally inept state agencies. See, e.g., THE KNOWN AND UNKNOWN I  CHILD WEI.FAHE 
RESEARCH: AN APPRAISAL (M. Norris & B. Wallace eds. 1965); Soifer, Parental Autonomy. 
Family Rights and the Illegitimate: A Constitutional Commentary, 7 CONN. L. REV. 1 
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tion, consonant with proper recognition of both children's and 
parents' rights, would be a determination on a case-by-case basis 
whether retention of parental consent is justified. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The court, without apparent needg5 or constitutional justifi- 
~ation,~%xtended a fundamental right of access to contraceptives 
passim (1974); Symposium-The Relationship between Promise and Performance in 
State Intervention in Family Life, 9 COLUM. J L. & SOC. PROB. 28 passim (1972). 
95. The court could have disposed of the case on two narrower grounds, although 
neither passes without argument. First, the court could have disposed of the case on 
supremacy clause grounds alone. For the dissent's rebuttal see note 65 supra. Second, it 
could have disposed of the case on equal protection grounds, as did the United States 
Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, note 10 and accompanying text supra. While not 
basing its decision on equal protection analysis, the Court mentioned that since the 
requirement of parental consent explicitly applied only to indigent minors whose families 
qualified for federal aid, the regulations would not withstand equal protection analysis. 
The latter statement seems faulty on two grounds. First, the dissent argued that since 
an indigent minor could obtain the same services with the requisite means, then the only 
classification is based on wealth, which the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent 
School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 422 U.S. 1, 18-28 (1973) held not to be a suspect classification 
and therefore not subject to the strict scrutiny applied in other contexts. Jones, supra, 
dissent a t  15. Thus, the only test required was the deferential "reasonable basis" test that 
was satisfied by the state's desire "not to be involved in the distribution of contraceptives 
to minors." Id. This is reasonable, argued the dissent, because "state statutes condemn 
sexual relations with minors" as well as fornication. Id. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-53-19 
(sexual relations with a female under 18 years, with or without consent, is a felony) and § 
76-53-5 (1953) (fornication classified as misdemeanor). 
Second, although the statutes do not explicitly reach affluent minors, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that the mere underinclusiveness of a statute is not grounds in itself 
for invalidation. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955); 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937); Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 
222 U.S. 225, 225-36 (1911). See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Equal 
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1084-87 (1969). This principle is pertinent, especially 
in light of the fact that affluent minors by common law likewise appear to be precluded 
from obtaining contraceptives without parental consent. Since an affluent minor could not 
obtain contraceptives except through his physician, he would fall within the category of 
"medical care," which the physician cannot legally administer without informed consent. 
See note 38 supra. Since minors rich and poor lack the ability to give informed consent 
absent specific exceptions equally applicable to rich and poor minors, notes 38-39 supra, 
all minors are affected equally. Further, Utah statutes imply a general parental consent 
requirement by specifically excusing the requirement in the treatment of a minor's vener- 
eal disease. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 26-6-39.1 (Supp. 1973). Other statutes specifically enforce 
parental consent requirements. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. 76-7-304(4) (Supp. 1973) 
(requiring parental consent for single minor girls to procure abortions) and 5 30-1-2 (1969) 
(requiring parental consent for males under 16 and females under 14 to marry). Other 
statutes express legislative opprobrium of teenage sexual activity. See, e.g., UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 50-19-9 (Supp. 1973) (prohibiting sale of "prophylactics" to persons under 18). 
96. According to long-recognized canons of constitutional interpretation, a court 
should dispose of the case on the narrowest possible grounds. Instead of disposing of the 
case on either the supremacy clause or equal protection grounds, the court continued to 
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to minors which it implicitly recognized the minor is ill-equipped 
to exercise. In doing so, the court failed to recognize longstanding 
parental rights and the state's interest in reinforcing those rights 
as interests against which the minors' nascent rights should have 
been balanced. In view of the foregoing, extension of the right of 
access to contraceptives to minors in the instant case appears to 
have been unjustified. 
the right of privacy, recognizing an unprecedented fundamental right of access to contra- 
ceptives both in adults and minors. The disposition of the case is thus in contrast with 
accepted rules of constitutional interpretation. Justice Brandeis laid out, in Ashwander 
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,346-48 (1936) (concurring), a series of rules "for its own governance," 
which were subsequently followed by the Supreme Court in deciding constitutional issues. 
Among the rules are that the Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader 
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied," quoting Liverpool, N.Y. 
& Phila. Steamship Co. v. Emigration Comm'rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885), and that "the 
Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show 
that he is injured by its operation." Accord, Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 
549 (1947) and Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,503 (1961) (Court will not adjudicate constitu- 
tional issues unless unavoidable). The plaintiff in the instant case did not show that she 
was injured by the operation of the regulations. She was not denied contraceptives because 
she could not obtain parental consent, but because she refused to do so. Jones, supra at 
2. 
